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CHAPTER 22 
Evidence 
FREDERICK A. MC DERMOTT 
§22.1. Judicial notice: Common knowledge. The scope of judicial 
notice encompasses matters within the common knowledge and ex-
perience of the community. Whether a particular fact is fairly within 
this common knowledge and experience is often a question upon 
which a difference of opinion is possible. Where there is no evidence 
at all, or no expert testimony, on the issue, the question of whether 
it can be resolved by judicial notice based upon such common knowl-
edge becomes crucial. Cases decided during the 1958 SURVEY year are 
illustrative. 
In Bagley v. Burkholder1 it was held that judicial notice could not 
be taken of a custom of mutual aid among truck drivers. The plain-
tiff and the defendant were both truck drivers. The plaintiff was in-
jured by an act of the defendant which the Supreme Judicial Court 
assumed would warrant a finding of ordinary negligence. Since the 
defendant at the time was acting gratuitously in moving the plaintiff's 
trailer as a favor for the plaintiff, and there was no evidence of gross 
negligence, it was held that a verdict should have been directed for the 
defendant. 
In an attempt to impose upon the defendant a duty of ordinary 
care, the plaintiff argued that the jury might reasonably have inferred 
that the defendant assisted the plaintiff not because of any personal 
kindheartedness, but because there was a deep-rooted custom among 
truck drivers to help each other in such circumstances and in the 
lively hope of obtaining similar assistance from the plaintiff or other 
drivers in the future. This arguably would make his service one ren-
dered for mutual benefit and not merely gratuitously. 
The Court held that any such future benefit to the defendant would 
be conjectural only, noting that there was no proof of any relevant 
custom of truckers, and stating that such a custom, if one existed, 
could not be judicially noticed. The ruling follows an earlier case in 
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which it was said that "[i]t is settled law that the court cannot take 
judicial notice of usages of particular trades, and that the question of 
the existence or not of claimed usage is a question of fact." 2 
While the decision itself does not appear to be objectionable, the 
above quoted language in the case cited by the Court unfortunately 
states an absolute. While there is no precise definition of "usage" to 
distinguish it clearly from a "practice," there are many cases in which 
it has been held that specific practices in various activities are within 
the field of common knowledge and may be judicially noticed. A 
more accurate general statement might therefore be to the effect that 
a usage, custom or practice of a particular trade, business or other ac-
tivity will not be judicially noticed unless it is a matter of common 
knowledge. There does not appear to be any clear dichotomy between 
a "practice" which may be judicially noticed and a "usage" or "cus-
tom" which may not, nor any justification for a Hat statement that a 
practice, usage or custom may not be a matter of common knowledge 
or the subject of judicial notice. 
In Jacquot v. Wm. Filene's Sons Co.,s on the issue of whether a cos-
metic product sold by defendant, an artificial fingernail kit, was in-
jurious to persons of normal sensitivity, there was testimony that 
when small amounts of the product were put on the thighs of two 
other persons and covered with band-aids, redness and inHammation 
resulted. It was held that this testimony should have been excluded, 
since in the absence of expert medical testimony to show that these 
tests were done in accordance with recognized medical standards, or 
to interpret the tests, the evidence had no probative value. In this 
case, a layman's general knowledge and experience could not be an 
adequate substitute for expert interpretation.4 
In Lovely's Case,5 a workmen's compensation case decided during 
the 1958 SURVEY year, the Supreme Judicial Court dealt with judicial 
notice of hernia. The employee, previously symptom-free, while carry-
ing a one-hundred-pound bag of sugar upstairs, felt pain in his right 
side. The pain continued, and that evening his groin began to swell. 
He continued to work with difficulty for two weeks, and about two 
weeks later was operated on for a hernia. There was no medical tes-
timony in support of the claim but the Court held that in such a 
simple situation, where the relationship between the sudden strain, 
the first symptoms and the hernia was so close and immediate, a lay-
man, unaided by expert opinion, could clearly reasonably infer that 
the strain caused the hernia, as a matter of general knowledge and 
experience.6 
2 Sluzis's Case. 292 Mass. !51. !54, 198 N.E. 262. 264 (19!5). 
S 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 575,149 N.E.2d 6!5. 
4 The converse situation is found in the exclusion of expert opinion when the 
matter is within common knowledge and experience. See §22.! infra. 
5 !36 Mass. 512. 146 N.E.2d 488 (1957). 
6 The case is reminiscent of cases such as Malone v. Bianchi, !18 Mass. 179, 61 
N.E.2d 1 (1945). in which it was held, in a suit for malpractice against a dentist. 
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This case is particularly interesting because the Court, in arriving 
at its decision, found it necessary to restrict the effect of earlier lan-
guage concerning the scope of common knowledge in respect to her-
nia used in Crowley's Case.7 In that case the Court said: 
Common knowledge may teach us that a "strain" may make mani-
fest or even aggravate an existing or incipient hernia, but unaided 
it does not enable a tribunal of fact to say that a "strain" is likely 
to originate a hernia, much less that it probably did so in a par-
ticular case.8 
The reviewing board in Lovely's Case, using lanugage apparently 
drawn from the foregoing quotation, had stated that it was "con-
strained to deny" the claim, which had been allowed by the single 
member. However, the Supreme Judicial Court distinguished the 
cases, and held that the language in the Crowley opinion "was used 
very specifically with reference to the complicated facts there involved, 
. . . and was not intended to have application to a simple situation 
like the present one." 9 
The distinction on the facts and the limitation of applicability of 
the language of the Crowley case were clearly proper. In Crowley, it 
was incumbent upon the claimant to establish that the hernia was 
caused on October 30. On that date, while pushing a heavy barrel, 
the claimant felt a sudden, severe pain and a sensation that something 
snapped in his body. However, he did not stop work, and the injury 
did not appear to be serious. He worked the next day and then served 
for several weeks as a· juror. On December 12, he again suffered pain 
while lifting a box and observed a gradually increasing swelling in 
the groin, which, however, did not cause him to stop work. He again 
strained himself in the same place on March 17 and stopped work for 
the rest of the day, but continued to work until April 4, when he had 
his hernia operation. 
On the facts of the Crowley case it is clear that the board would be 
indulging in speculation rather than common knowledge if it were to 
find that the injury of October 30, and not the later injuries of either 
that it was not necessary to have the testimony of a dental expert to establish the 
standard of care of dentists in the community when the evidence showed that the 
defendant had, in the process of extracting several of the plaintiff's teeth, lost one 
of them (which later lodged in her lower bronchus) down the plaintiff's throat and 
sent her on her way without mention of the fact. 
In the Lovely case, as in Bianchi and other similar cases, the Court has held 
that the finding would be permissive and not required. The line in such cases, 
if one exists, would appear to be extremely thin. At the least it may be said that 
a finding to the contrary of that indicated by common knowledge and experience 
would appear to warrant a motion for a new trial on the ground that the finding 
is against the weight of the evidence and the result of pure speculation on the part 
of the jury. 
7287 Mass. 367, 191 N.E. 668 (1934). 
8287 Mass. at 375-376, 191 N.E. at 672. 
9336 Mass. 512, 515,146 N.E.2d 488, 491. 
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or both December 12 or March 17, was the cause of the hernia actually 
suffered. Such a finding could obviously be made properly only with 
the aid of medical opinion. 
The result in Lovely's Case is good, because application of un-
guarded language of the Crowley case to simpler situations would 
have the effect of unduly limiting the scope of common knowledge and 
therefore of judicial notice. 
§22.2. Estoppel: Demand for admission of fact. General Laws, c. 
231, §69, which provides for the filing of a "Demand for Admission of 
Fact or Execution of Paper," was substantially amended by Acts of 
1946, c. 450.1 The crucial language in the statute as so amended is 
the following: "Any admission made by a party by answering or not 
answering such demand ... shall be binding upon him in the pend-
ing proceeding unless he is relieved therefrom by the court for cause 
shown." 
Some twelve years after the amendment, during the 1958 SURVEY 
year, this language was construed for the first time, although only in 
elementary application. It was held ih Snowden v. Cheltenham 2 that 
a party who had failed to deny a fact, and in Krinsky v. Pilgrim Trust 
CO.3 that a party who had admitted a fact, under a demand in accord-
§22.2. 1 As so amended, G.L., c. 231, §69 reads as follows: "Demand for Ad-
mission of Fact or of Execution of Paper. In any action at law or suit in equity a 
party by written demand filed in the clerk's office and notice given by copy thereof 
by registered mail, return receipt requested, to the other party or his attorney, not 
less than ten days before the trial of the action or suit, may call upon the other 
party to admit, for the purposes of the case only, any material fact or facts or the 
execution of any material paper or document which the party filing the demand in-
tends to use at the trial. Copies of the papers or documents shall be delivered with 
the demand unless copies have already been furnished. An affidavit of such notice 
and the return receipt, if any, shall forthwith be filed in the clerk's office. The 
court may delay the trial until such demand is answered and on motion before trial 
may strike out of such demand or any answer filed in response thereto any matter 
which is irrelevant, immaterial or improperly included therein. After the filing of 
said affidavit of notice, each of the matters of which an admission is demanded shall 
be deemed admitted unless within ten days after mailing the demand, or within 
such further time as the court may allow on motion and notice, the party to whom 
the demand is directed files in the clerk's office a sworn statement either denying 
specifically the matters of which an admission is demanded or setting forth in detail 
the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters. Any ad-
mission made by a party by answering or not answering such demand is for the 
purpose of the pending proceeding only and neither constitutes an admission by 
him for any other purpose nor may be used against him in any other proceeding, 
but said admission shall be binding upon him in the pending proceeding unless he 
is relieved therefrom by the court for cause shown. If the party upon whom such 
demand is made refuses to admit any fact or the execution of any paper or docu-
ment mentioned in the demand, the reasonable expense of proving such fact or the 
execution of such paper or document, as determined after summary hearing by the 
justice presiding at the trial, shall, unless the justice certifies that the refusal to 
admit was reasonable, be paid by said party to the other party and the amount 
thereof shall be added to the taxable costs of the party in whose favor such amount 
is awarded or deducted from the amount of any judgment or decree against him." 
2 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 557, 149 N.E.2d 606. 
s 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 691, 149 N.E.2d 665. 
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ance with the statute, is bound thereby and is not permitted to intro-
duce evidence to the contrary.4 While the statute expressly provides 
that a party may be relieved from the binding effect of such an ad-
mission, it appears that the mere admission of controverting evidence, 
without more, will not be held to be the equivalent of this permissible 
exercise of discretion.5 
Prior to the amendment of 1946 the statute provided that any ad-
mission thereunder "shall, if offered by the party who filed such de-
mand, be admitted in evidence." The estoppel resulting from the 
amendment noted by the Snowden and Krinsky decisions is clear. 
However, the full extent to which the amendment may have changed 
the effect of the procedure is not readily apparent upon a mere read-
ing of the two versions of the statute. Questions as to the further 
effect of the present statute, of importance in the trial of cases, and 
to which the answers are not clear, are still undecided. It may not be 
amiss to indicate and briefly discuss the implications of some of these 
questions. 
The Supreme Judicial Court stated in Krinsky that "[t]he principles 
stated in Gordon v. American Tankers Corp . ... are no longer appli-
cable in view of the 1946 amendment of §69." 6 In the Gordon case,7 
speaking of the earlier form of the statute, the Court said, in the 
course of the portion of the opinion referred to in the preceding para-
graph: 
The statute while important and liberalizing in some respects is 
limited in scope in other aspects. The demand and answers are 
not in the case at all until offered by the party who filed the de-
mand. There is no provision that the party making the answers 
may offer them. There is no mandate that the demand and an-
4 The binding effect of an admission under the statute was also noted in Poulin 
v. H. A. Tobey Lumber Corp., 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 391, 148 N.E.2d 277. 
5 "The facts admitted ... are binding upon the defendant and cannot be con-
troverted by it unless it is relieved therefrom by the court for cause shown, wnlch 
was not done here." Krinsky v. Pilgrim Trust Co., 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 691, 696, 149 
N.E.2d 665, 670. 
"Since she had neglected to admit or deny whether she had signed these agree-
ments when called upon to do so in a demand to admit facts ... she was bound 
by her failure and she should not have been permitted at the trial to deny that she 
executed them." Snowden v. Cheltenham, 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 557, 558, 149 
N.E.2d 606, 607. 
Compare, however, the practice of the Supreme Judicial Court of inferring that 
the requisite preliminary findings have been made or not made, as the case may be, 
in sustaining a ruling below when the record is silent on the fact. See Day Trust 
Co. v. Malden Savings Bank, 328 Mass. 576, 105 N.E.2d 363 (1952); Murphy v. 
Hanright, 238 Mass. 200, 130 N.E. 204 (1921). 
The provision of the statute to the effect that a party may for cause shown be 
relieved from an admission thereunder is consistent with the general principle that 
a court has inherent authority to relieve a party from an improvident stipulation. 
Malone v. Bianchi, 318 Mass. 179, 182, 61 N.E.2d I, 2 (1945). 
61958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 691, 696, 149 N.E.2d 665, 670. 
7286 Mass. 349, 191 N.E. 51 (1934). 
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swers shall be taken as facts for the purpose of the trial. When 
the demand and answers are offered by the party who filed the de-
mand they are simply to be "admitted in evidence." The statute 
makes no declaration as to their quality as evidence. It does not 
provide that they shall become binding upon both parties. There 
is no declaration that the party making the demand or the party 
making the answers shall be bound by them. In this respect the 
statute is significantly different from that relating to pleadings 
where each party as well as the court is bound by his allegations.8 
As has been already stated, it is clear both from the changed lan-
guage of the statute and the decisions above referred to, that admis-
sions under the 1946 amendment are not merely evidence but that they 
bind the party making them. 
Consideration of the effect of the 1946 amendment upon other prop-
ositions stated in the Gordon opinion opens up some interesting possi-
bilities. First, it would appear that admissions under the statute no 
longer need be, and in fact, should not be introduced in evidence, but 
must be judicially noticed. The necessity for judicial notice of the 
demand and admission or denial appears to be implicit in the statute. 
Again, while the words of the statute do not expressly so provide, 
and it might be stretching things too far to cite for the point the broad 
language of the Krinsky opinion, both are at least consistent with the 
further proposition that the effect of the statute, when an admission 
is made, is to work an estoppel not only on the party charged with the 
admission, but also on the party demanding it. In other words, the 
statute in its amended form could well be held to have the effect of 
creating a stipulation binding on both parties, when one demands, 
and the other acquiesces in, an admission that certain facts be taken 
to be true for the purposes of the trial.9 
Finally, even when the demand is met by a denial of the asserted 
facts, it would not seem unreasonable to hold that each party is there-
after estopped to introduce evidence to his own advantage to the con-
trary of the position thus formally taken by him, unless the court 
should for cause shown relieve him from such estoppel. There here 
appears to be a basis for a plausible analogy to a formal or judicial 
admission.1o 
8286 Mass. at S54, 191 N.E. at 5S. 
9 For an interesting illustration of an analogous implied stipulation (although it 
is not a citable authority upon the point), see the opinion in Fairman v. Board of 
Appeal of Melrose as originally published in 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 17S, 174, 117 N.E.2d 
829, 8S0. (The holding therein that the "equivalent of a stipulation" was effective 
as to matters determinative of the question of the jurisdiction of the trial court was 
critically noted in 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §26.S.) 
The opinion in the case as it appears in the official Massachusetts Reports, SSI 
Mass. 160, and in the reprint of the Northeastern reporter in Massachusetts Decisions, 
omits the express holding as to the stipulation. 
10 Situations where such an estoppel would apply would probably occur infre-
quently. Compare, however, the facts in Gordon v. American Tankers Corp., 286 
Mass. M9, 191 N.E. 51 (1934). 
An initial though somewhat obvious caution may be stated, that there is no 
6
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Finally, even when the trial court, for cause shown, relieves a party 
from the binding effect of an estoppel arising under the statute, it 
would appear to be proper to allow the opponent to put into evidence 
the fact that the party had earlier taken the position now detrimental 
to him.H 
Although none of the suggestions in the preceding paragraphs have 
been adjudicated, they appear to be sound. The propositions that a 
stipulation or an estoppel may be created have been recognized as pos-
sibilities, although expressly left without resolution, in language of 
the Court both before and after the amendment. Thus, in the 
Gordon case, the Court said: 
Either party may encounter great practical difficulty in offering 
evidence to contradict what is thus exhibited in the demand and 
answers. Whether either party may offer such evidence and to 
what extent he may ask to have such evidence considered in con· 
tradiction of the demand or answers made by him in view of the 
principle declared in Sullivan v. Boston Elevated Railway, 224 
Mass. 405, that a witness is bound by his categorical and positive 
final evidence, are not presented for decision in this case. In any 
event parties must be held to the utmost good faith. 12 
And in the Krinsky case, the Court twice referred to this point when 
it said: 
The plaintiff saved no exception to the ruling permIttmg the 
defendant to read to the jury two items which were included in 
the admission of facts but which the plaintiff omitted to read ... 
The plaintiff took no exception to the ruling of the trial judge 
in permitting the defendant to introduce those parts of the notice 
to admit facts and the admissions of those facts which the plaintiff 
did not himself introduce. Obviously, no exception having been 
taken, we need not consider the point. 13 
§22.3. Opinion evidence. Generally inadmissible. It is elementary 
that opinions, inferences or conclusions of a witness are, under the 
analogy here to the process of taking or the effect of interrogatories. Thus, the 
prohibition in the last clause of G.L., c. 231, §89 has no bearing on these proposi-
tions, even by analogy: "The answers of a party to interrogatories filed may be read 
by the other party as evidence at the trial. The party interrogated may require 
the whole of the answers upon anyone subject matter inquired of to be read, if a 
part of them is read; but if no part is read, the party interrogated shall in no way 
avail himself of his examination or of the fact that he has been examined." 
11 By analogy to the situation in which the Commonwealth is permitted to intro-
duce in evidence at the trial as a confession the fact that the defendant had originally 
pleaded "guilty" even though the trial court has allowed a motion to withdraw that 
plea and enter a plea of "not guilty." See Morrissey v. Powell, 304 Mass. 268, 23 
N.E.2d 411 (1939). See also Commonwealth v. Haywood, 247 Mass. 16, 141 N.E. 571 
(1923); 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §23.3. 
12286 Mass. 349. 355, 191 N.E. 51. 53 (1934). 
131958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 691,696-697, 149 N.E.2d 665, 670. 
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general rule, excluded where the matter is properly one of fact for the 
unaided fact-finder, or one of law for the court. This general rule was 
illustrated in two cases during the past year. 
In Scully v. Joseph Connolly Ice Cream Sales Corp.} the plaintiff 
had been thrown to the floor by catching her foot while leaving a 
booth on the premises of the defendant. The jury had taken a view, 
and there were pictures of the booth in evidence. The witness was 
an expert in the designing of store fixtures, and a question called for 
his opinion that the construction and maintenance of the booth was 
improper. Judicially noticing that the booth in design and construc-
tion was similar to those commonly found in places like the defend-
ant's store, the Supreme Judicial Court held exclusion proper. The 
relevant facts were simple, fully before the jury, and of a nature to be 
easily comprehended by them. The matter was obviously not proper 
for expert opinion. 
Similarly, in Smith Beverages, Inc. v. Metropolitan Casualty In-
surance Co.? where in a suit for a loss on a burglary insurance policy 
the defense was the failure by the insured plaintiff to file proof of loss 
within a required sixty-day period, the Court upheld exclusion of the 
opinion of an accountant that it would not have been possible within 
that time to prepare a proof of loss in the detail required by the de-
fendant's form. 
The Smith Beverages opinion noted that the evidence did not es-
tablish facts which might have constituted obstacles to prompt filing, 
that the question may have improperly called for interpretation of the 
requirements of the company form (a question of law), and finally that 
the matter was not plainly the proper subject of either lay or expert 
opinion testimony. On a full presentation of the facts, the question 
would appear to be susceptible of decision on the basis of common 
knowledge and normal experience. 
Elementary observation admissible. As a reasonable and adminis-
tratively necessary exception to the general rule of exclusion, the 
opinion, inference, or conclusion of the witness is admissible when it 
concerns an elementary matter of common observation. In many such 
cases it would also be either impossible or at best inordinately difficult 
to establish the basic facts by evidence. 
Thus, in Brown v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.,s the 
Supreme Judicial Court approved the admission of testimony of a wife 
that prior to an accident her husband had been "generally very nerv-
ous" and thereafter became "extremely nervous . . . pitifully so" 
and that he did not "look well enough to go home" when he was re-
leased from a hospital. Exception to the use of the characterization 
of "pitiful" might properly have been taken, but in the context it 
§22.3. 1336 Mass. 392, 145 N.E.2d 826 (1957). 
21958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 531,149 N.E.2d 146. 
3336 Mass. 609, 147 N.E.2d 160 (1958). 
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would not appear to be prejudicial to a degree sufficient to warrant 
reversal. 
Layman familiar with property. Another exception to the general 
rule of exclusion of opinion is that which permits one familiar with 
the characteristics of particular property through use of and experi-
ence with it, to give an estimate of its value as a so-called "lay expert." 
An interesting example of this type of case was afforded in Willey v. 
Cafrella,4 in which the owner of an automobile who had operated it 
for nine months was permitted to give his opinion as to its value 
before and after an accident. The latter opinion was held to be ad-
missible even though the witness had not seen the car after the acci-
dent, and its condition at that time was made known to him only by 
statements of third persons and pictures which were in evidence.5 
The opinion contains some illuminating statements as to how such 
a witness, who, although he is familiar with the property, may have 
only inadequate ideas as to its value, may utilize hearsay in formulat-
ing an admissible opinion: 
The owner must act reasonably and fairly in giving an estimate of 
the diminution in the market value of his automobile. He could 
consult others in an effort in good faith to arrive at a just result. 
He could heed such opinions as commend themselves to him. The 
plaintiff had driven the automobile for several months. The gen-
eral extent of its damage was fairly shown by the photographs. 
For instance, he could decide from various estimates whether it 
was best to repair or to sell the damaged vehicle. He would have 
to depend on others in deciding what to do. It does not appear 
from the record what course he pursued or if he sold it what price 
he obtained. We do not think the plaintiff was disqualified from 
expressing an opinion on market value due to the accident. So 
far as appears his estimate of the value of the damaged automo-
bile was not enhanced from the information he received. The 
case differs from Maher v. Commonwealth, 291 Mass. 343, and 
Downey v. Union Trust Co. 312 Mass. 405, 416-417. In the 
former case an opinion of a landowner not versed in the market 
4336 Mass. 623, 146 N.E.2d 895 (1958). 
5 A caveat must, of course, be observed that unless there is evidence (other than 
the hearsay reports to the owner) as to the condition of the property at the time in 
question, so as to warrant the finding of the facts used as the basis for the opinion, 
the opinion will be subject to being excluded or stricken. Charron's Case, 331 Mass. 
519, 522-523, 120 N.E.2d 754, 757 (1954). See 1955 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §22.6; see 
also text supported by notes 7-9 infra. 
Furthermore, in a situation such as in the Willey case, where the witness, although 
he is the owner, has no personal knowledge of the facts at the relevant time, i.e., 
after the accident, it would seem proper to require that his opinion be given in 
answer to a hypothetical question, as would be required in the case of a true 
expert with no personal knowledge of the actual condition of the property. See 
Commonwealth v. Vaughn, 329 Mass. 333, 108 N.E.2d 559 (1952); Barber v. Merriam, 
11 Allen 322, 324·325 (Mass. 1865). 
9
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value of his land was raised a substantial amount ($50,000) as a 
result of conferring with experts. In the latter case, the opinion 
of the plaintiff as to the value of her services was based solely on 
hearsay expressions of her mother. Nothing like that appears in 
the present case.6 
Necessity of factual basis for hypothetical question. When the sub-
ject is properly one for an expert, the opinion of the expert, even 
though he has had no personal observation of some or all of the rele-
vant facts, may nevertheless be admitted in answer to a question which 
presents a proper hypothetical case, based upon the facts in evidence. 
Thus, in Kramer v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co.,7 it was 
held to be error to exclude the relevant opinions of qualified experts 
as to the existence of a disease of the heart in the insured when he 
applied for life insurance in 1952. The experts had testified as to 
their personal observations as to the condition of the insured at the 
time of earlier examinations in 1943 and 1948, respectively, and they 
were asked hypothetical questions as to whether in their opinion a 
person suffering such ailments as they had observed and diagnosed 
would still be suffering from the same conditions in 1952. The opin-
ions were held to be relevant and admissible and their exclusion was 
held to be reversible error. 
When the hypothetical question must be resorted to, it is, of course, 
elementary that it must be based upon facts in evidence. Since the 
hypothesis merely assumes and does not establish the facts upon which 
the opinion is based, when the basic facts are not otherwise in evi-
dence, the opinion is not admissible as a matter of right. Even if the 
question is admitted de bene in the discretion of the court, the opinion 
will be stricken (on motion or by the court sua sponte) if the support-
ing facts are not thereafter supplied by evidence.s 
Even if an opinion under such circumstances is not stricken, it may 
be ignored as not being evidence in the case. Thus, in Brown v. 
United States Fidelity and Guaranty CO.,9 where a physician's expert 
opinion, which had been admitted in evidence, was essential to the 
6336 Mass. 623, 624-625, 146 N.E.2d 895, 896 (1958). The similarity of this analysis 
to that of the acceptable use of hearsay by an expert in arriving at an opinion is 
obvious. Compare the following: " ... although it might not be admissible merely 
to repeat what a witness had read in a book not itself admissible, still, when one 
who is competent on the general subject accepts from his reading as probably true 
a matter of detail which he has not verified, the fact gains an authority which it 
would not have from the printed page alone, and subject perhaps to the exercise of 
some discretion, may be admitted." Finnegan v. Fall River Gas Works Co., 159 
Mass. 31I, 312-313, 34 N.E. 523 (1893). See also Kuklinska v. Maplewood Homes, 
Inc., 336 Mass. 489, 495-496, 146 N.E.2d 523, 527 (1957). 
7336 Mass. 465, 146 N.E.2d 357 (1957). 
S Charron's Case, 331 Mass. 519, 120 N.E.2d 754 (1954), noted in 1955 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §22.6. Such an opinion has no better standing on cross-examination of 
the expert. Jacquot v. Wm. Filene's Sons Co., 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 575, 579·580, 149 
N.E.2d 635, 639-640. 
D 336 Mass. 609, 147 N.E.2d 160 (1958). 
10
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plaintiff beneficiary's attempt to prove death of the insured by acci-
dent, it was held proper to direct a verdict for the defendant under 
leave reserved, even after denial of a motion to strike the opinion, 
when the hypothetical question in answer to which it was given con-
tained assumptions of which some were exaggerated and others were 
gratuitous and without support in the evidence, and the question also 
omitted relevant facts which were in evidence. Such an opinion, said 
the Court, is "no real opinion at all," and therefore "not a proper 
or adequate basis" for a jury finding. 
§22.4. Hearsay. Waiver of objection. It is, of course, elementary 
that hearsay evidence is inadmissible over proper objection. The hear-
say objection may be waived, however, and failure to make proper 
objection on that particular ground is held to constitute such a waiver. 
Even when the only relevance of the evidence is for a hearsay purpose 
and a general objection would therefore suffice, the result of a failure 
to object is that the evidence may be admitted, and once in the case 
may be given whatever probative force the fact-finder sees fit. Thus, 
in Poulin v. H. A. Tobey Lumber Corp.,l a police officer's report of a 
conversation with the defendant's truck operator (who had no au-
thority to make admissions as an agent of the defendant) as to the facts 
of the accident in suit, to which no objection had been interposed, 
was held to be entitled to full probative force as a statement of the 
circums tances. 
When the adversary himself elicits the hearsay evidence, the same 
result follows a fortiori. In Krinsky v. Pilgrim Trust CO.,2 a suit for 
money had and received, in which the defendant bank had charged 
back to the plaintiff's account the amount of certain checks previously 
credited thereto on the ground that such checks bore forged endorse-
ments, the defendant bank drew from the plaintiff testimony that a 
third person had stated that the endorsements were genuine. This 
testimony, which was clear hearsay on the forgery issue, was held to be 
entitled to its full probative effect. 
Improper objection. When evidence offered generally is relevant 
for both a hearsay and a non-hearsay purpose, its admission over a 
general objection is not error. Thus, in Edelstein v. Old Colony Trust 
Co.,s in which the issue was whether the corporate executor had acted 
with the reasonable prudence that would be proper for a fiduciary in 
compromising claims and disputes regarding ownership of property 
claimed to be assets of the estate of the decedent, the admission over 
general objection of reports and statements of third persons to the 
executor as to the facts controlling the issue of title was affirmed. 
On the question of good faith and reasonableness of the action of 
the executor, in the light of the facts as they might have appeared to 
it, the evidence was not hearsay, although on the issue of the actual 
§22.4. 11958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 391, 148 N.E.2d 277. 
21958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 691, 149 N.E.2d 665. 
S 336 Mass. 659, 147 N.E.2d 193 (1958). 
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facts as to title to the property, it would clearly have been hearsay. 
Since the executor could prevail on showing reasonably prudent action 
on its part either upon the facts as they actually were or as they reason-
ably appeared to it, a general objection was not sufficient to require 
exclusion of the evidence. In the opinion it was stated that the judge 
appeared to have considered the testimony only in its non-hearsay 
aspect. However, it would not affect the decision affirming the ad-
mission of the evidence had it been true that the trial judge had given 
it full probative effect on the actual facts, since the evidence was ad-
mitted generally. 
A similar situation was exemplified in the case of Willey v. Cafrella,4 
in which the defendant's motion to strike testimony of the plaintiff 
as to information conveyed to him by third persons about the con-
dition of his automobile and as to his opinion based thereon, of its 
value after an accident, was denied. On the issue as to the actual con-
dition of the car as a result of the accident the evidence would clearly 
be hearsay, but as showing the basis on which the owner formulated 
an opinion as to its then value the evidence would not be hearsay.5 
Prior inconsistent statement. In Wheeler v. Howes,6 the plaintiff, 
after having made out a prima facie case of negligence, on cross-exami-
nation drew from the defendant's witness an admission that shortly 
after the accident in issue, the witness had given to representatives of 
the plaintiff a statement of the events inconsistent with his direct testi-
mony and favorable to the plaintiff. Over objection and exception 
the witness was permitted to read the earlier statement in evidence 
with an instruction to the jury that it was admitted "only on the 
credibility of this witness and not as bearing on whether or not that 
did happen." 
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, on the ground that while use 
of the earlier statement as proof of the facts stated therein would con-
stitute hearsay,7 its use merely to prove that the statement had been 
made, in an attack on the credibility of the witness, was proper. 
While there is, of course, a danger that the jury will not observe the 
limiting instruction, the opponent is not entitled to have the evidence 
excluded. 
The ruling that the opponent is entitled to the limiting instruction 
is the rule in the great majority of jurisdictions.s There is, however, 
minority but eminently respectable authority9 to the effect that it 
4336 Mass. 623, 146 N.E.2d 895 (1958). 
5 The opinion aspects of this case are discussed in §22.3 supra. 
61958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 699,150 N.E.2d 1. 
71t must, of course, be noted that the prior statement of the witness here is not 
within any of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. If it is, as, e.g., if the witness is a 
party, and the prior statement is unfavorable to him, it would be admissible as an 
admission, despite its hearsay character. 
S See 3 Wigmore, Evidence §1018 (3d ed. 1940). 
9 See United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corp., 241 F.2d 925, 933 (2d Cir. 1957), 
and cases cited therein. See 3 Wigmore, Evidence §1018(b) (3d ed. 1940); Morgan, 
Some Problems of Proof 130·133 (1956); Note, 62 Yale L.J. 650 (1953). 
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would be proper to admit the prior inconsistent statement as evidence 
of the facts stated therein on the ground that the hearsay dangers are 
not present. 
When, as in Massachusetts, the limiting instruction is given, the 
jury's mere disbelief of the testimony at the trial would not alone 
constitute evidence to prove affirmatively the contrary of the testi-
mony.lO Therefore, when the burden is on the proponent on the 
issue, as in the Wheeler case, if there is no other evidence to the same 
effect, the jury may not find the facts to be as stated in the prior in-
consistent statement, and the proponent must lose on that issue as a 
matter of law.11 
The foregoing situation must, of course, be distinguished from one 
in which the witness finally adopts the prior statement as his testimony 
and abandons his earlier testimony at the trial.12 In this situation the 
version last settled upon by the witness is taken to be his testimony13 
and the hearsay aspect disappears. 
Further, the opponent may, of course, make the fatal error of not 
requesting that the limiting instruction be given, in which case the 
earlier statement, although under the Massachusetts rule it is inad-
missible hearsay, is in the case generally, and may be given full pro-
bative force because of the lack of proper objection.14 
§22.5. Best evidence rule: Existence of the original not a prelimi-
nary question for the judge. An interesting question of first impres-
sion in Massachusetts was decided during the 1958 SURVEY year in 
Fauci v. Mulready,1 in which a majority of the Supreme Judicial Court 
held it to be error for the trial judge, on a preliminary hearing on the 
admissibility of a copy of the written contract sued on, to decide the 
question of whether the alleged original had ever existed. 
The plaintiff sued the insurer on a completion bond on the con-
10 "Upon such an issue as that at bar it might indeed be possible to argue that 
the owner's denial could be used in positive support of his consent. He has personal 
acquaintance with the fact, and the jury is certainly free to find affirmatively that 
his denial is untrue. Moreover, to find the denial false of something necessarily 
known to the witness, ought to result in finding true the proposition denied. That, 
however, WOUld, at least if generalized, carry matters too far. An executor could 
not for example prove a contract with his testator by calling the promisor, and 
demanding a verdict because his denial was patently untrue. The law does not 
ordinarily cut so fine; a party must produce affirmative proof. Cruzan v. N.Y.C. &: 
H.R.R.R. Co., 227 Mass. 594,597,116 N.E. 879; Lonergan v. Peck, 136 Mass. 361, 364 
(semble) . .. D'Arcangelo v. Tartar, 265 Mass. 350, 164 N.E. 87, is apparently to 
the contrary on the facts, but the court certainly did not mean to overrule the 
earlier Massachusetts decisions." Learned Hand, J., in Pariso v. Towse, 45 F.2d 962, 
964 (2d Cir. 1930). See also Zarrillo v. Stone, 317 Mass. 510, 58 N.E.2d 848 (1945); 
Boston v. Santosuosso, 307 Mass. 302,349,30 N.E.2d 278,304·305 (1940). 
11 See Mroczek v. Craig, 312 Mass. 236, 239, 44 N.E.2d 644, 646 (1942). 
12 See Desmond v. Boston Elevated Railway Co., 319 Mass. 13, 14·15, 64 N.E.2d 357, 
358-359 (1946). 
13 Sullivan v. Boston Elevated Railway Co., 224 Mass. 405, 112 N.E. 1025 (1916). 
14 Salonen v. Paanenen, 320 Mass. 568, 575,71 N.E.2d 227, 232 (1947). 
§22.5. 11958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 817,150 N.E.2d 286. 
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struction of a trawler. He alleged the execution and delivery to him-
self of such a bond, and that it had since been lost, destroyed or pur-
posely secreted from him by others. The defendant denied that it had 
furnished any such bond. 
A preliminary hearing, without jury, was held to determine the ad-
missibility of a copy of the alleged bond. The plaintiff introduced 
evidence that would warrant findings of the existence of the bond and 
of facts explaining its nonproduction by him. After the jury was 
empaneled, the judge found and ruled as follows: "I am not satisfied 
that there was any such original instrument. Therefore a copy ... 
cannot be introduced in evidence and 1 direct a verdict . . . for the 
defendant." 2 The plaintiff excepted. 
The trial judge, as the Supreme Judicial Court observed, "plainly 
took the understandable view that if he found the document had never 
existed, he could not logically decide that it had been lost and dealt 
with the problem as a preliminary question of fact relating to the com-
petency of evidence." a However, in the absence of binding authority 
in Massachusetts, the majority of the Court decided to follow the pro-
visions of the Model Code of Evidence,4 and held the judge to be in 
error in finding on the existence of the original, and sustained the 
. plaintiff's exception. 
Under this decision, the question of whether the parties executed 
the contract declared upon is for the jury and not the judge. This 
would appear to be a proposition so fundamental as to be obvious, if 
the claim of a trial by jury is to have any significance in a case of this 
type. However, logical explanation and procedural implementation 
of the decision require analysis and warrant some discussion. 
There are involved here two severable questions of fact: first, did 
the parties execute the alleged instrument; and second, assuming that 
they did, did facts exist which under the best evidence rule would 
excuse the plaintiff from producing it? The proponent has the burden 
of proof on both, and must introduce evidence on both. But, since 
the question of execution is for the jury, the only function of the 
judge in respect thereto is to rule as a matter of law whether there is 
evidence to warrant a finding of execution. He must, however, find 
the facts involved in the second question, preliminary to ruling on the 
admissibility of the secondary evidence of the content of the contract. 
If the matter is heard by the judge in the absence of the jury, no 
special difficulty arises. If, however, the jury is present, a ,minor pro-
2 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 8211, 150 N.E.2d at 291. 
a 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 825, 150 N.E.2d at 292. 
4 Model Code of Evidence, Rule 602 (1942). Under this rule, once "evidence has 
been introduced sufficient to support a finding that the writing [other than an 
official record] once existed and is not a writing produced at the trial," secondary 
evidence may be introduced if the judge finds, after "assuming that the writing 
once existed," that the writing "is now unavailable for some reason other than the 
culpable negligence or wrong doing of the proponent of the evidence, or ... [that] 
it would be unfair or inexpedient to require the proponent to produce the writing." 
Rule 70 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence (19511) is to the same effect. 
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cedural complication ensues. A showing of the existence of the orig-
inal by secondary evidence is, of course, a logically necessary prelude 
to proof of what has since happened to it, and the showing of the exe-
cution of the instrument will be inseparable from reference to the 
contents thereof, to whatever extent they may be required to identify 
the document with that in issue. This stage of the hearing is prelim-
inary, however, and the evidence of execution is being offered for the 
primary purpose of obtaining a ruling that a finding of execution is 
warranted. So much of this evidence as is heard by the jury is before 
them therefore only de bene. 
If the judge rules that a finding of the existence of the original is 
warranted, he must assume that it was executed, since the jury may so 
find, and proceed to hear evidence as to what has since happened to it. 
The best evidence rule requires findings by the judge only in connec-
tion with this latter question. 
If the judge finds facts which he holds satisfy the rule, he rules 
that the proponent's secondary evidence as to the content of the docu-
ment is admissible for consideration by the jury. If the judge does not 
find such facts, he rules that secondary evidence of its content is inad-
missible, and that the evidence of execution and content of the alleged 
original already heard de bene shall be disregarded. 
The gist of the Fauci decision is thus that the existence of the orig-
inal of a document is not a preliminary fact question for the judge on 
the invocation of the best evidence rule. However, the fact that the 
trial judge in the Fauci case treated the question as one for his deter-
mination as preliminary to his ruling on admissibility of the secondary 
evidence is, as the opinion stated, understandable, not only for the 
reason given by the Supreme Judicial Court, but also for the perhaps 
more cogent reason that the Court itself was divided on the propriety 
of his action. 
It may safely be said that in few, if any, other areas of the law is 
there as great confusion as exists, in Massachusetts and elsewhere, in 
the field of the fact-finding function of the judge incidental to ruling 
upon the admissibility of evidence. The Fauci opinion cites the lead-
ing authorities, whose writings amply attest to this fact.1! It is not 
possible, within the scope of this article, to treat the problem ade-
quately, but some observations on the general subject may not be 
amiss. 
The general principle laid down in Massachusetts was restated in the 
opinion in the Fauci case, and is to the effect that it is for "the judge 
I! For an outstanding example see Maguire and Epstein, Preliminary Questions of 
Fact in Determining the Admissibility of Evidence, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 392 (1927), an 
heroic but hopeless attempt to reconcile the cases, including many of the better 
known Massachusetts decisions on the subject, which concludes that seven different 
theories, some of fantastic complexity, would be involved. Professor Maguire has 
since written that he "warns his public that he has considerably changed his mind 
since those early days." Maguire, Evidence - Common Sense and Common Law 
219 (1947). 
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to decide all questions on the admissibility of evidence . . . 
[and] any preliminary questions of fact, ... the solution of which 
may be necessary to ... determine the ... question of admissi-
bility." 6 A further sentence in the original case adds "[a]nd his de-
cision is conclusive, unless he saves the question for revision by the 
full court, on a report of the evidence, or counsel bring up the ques-
tion on a bill of exceptions which contains a statement of the evi-
dence." 7 
The inadequacy in this statement lies in its easy assumption that in 
all rulings on admissibility, all fact questions should be resolved by 
the judge. It makes no distinction nor allowance for distinction be-
tween the different types of questions that call for rulings on admissi-
bility. Nor has the Court in the past attempted to refine the state-
ment, with the exception of the situations in criminal prosecutions 
where the "Massachusetts humane rule" has made the judge's prelim-
inary finding of facts subject to review by the jury, which in itself has 
been described as an "anomalous practice." 8 Thus the rule has been 
applied without regard to whether the question was one preliminary 
to establishing the capacity of a witness,9 the qualification of an ex-
pert,10 the existence of a privilege,11 or the competency12 or the rele-
vancy 13 of offered evidence. 
An eminent authority on the law of evidence, Professor Edmund M. 
Morgan, in an article14 that was cited in the opinion in the Fauci case, 
advocates a rule to the effect that when the question of admissibility 
concerns the relevancy of offered evidence, and such relevancy involves 
a question of fact, the question of fact must be preserved for the jury 
and is not proper for preliminary decision by the judge. The opinion 
in the Fauci case may be taken as an indication that the Court might, 
when a proper case is before it, adopt the proposition advocated by 
Professor Morgan. In speaking of the general principle that all pre-
liminary fact questions are for the judge, the Court recognized the 
distinction. The opinion stated: "This principle has been consistently 
applied in Massachusetts where competency of evidence under a tech-
nical exclusionary rule depends upon the judge's determination that a 
particular situation of fact exists. That determination is conclusive 
if there is evidence to support it." 15 After citing cases in illustration 
61958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 817, 824, 150 N.E.2d 286, 291, quoting from Gorton v. 
Hadsell, 9 Cush. 508, 511 (Mass. 1852). 
7 Gorton v. Hadsell, 9 Cush. 508, 511 (Mass. 1852). 
8 Commonwealth v. Polian, 288 Mass. 494, 498, 193 N.E. 68, 70 (1934). 
9 Commonwealth v. Tatisos, 238 Mass. 322, 130 N.E. 495 (1921). 
10 Muskegat Island Club v. Inhabitants of Nantucket, 185 Mass. 303, 70 N.E. 61 
(1904). 
11 See Republic of Greece v. Koukouras, 264 Mass. 318, 162 N.E. 345 (1928). 
12 McSweeney v. Edison Electric Illuminating Co., 228 Mass. 563, 117 N.E. 847 
(1917). 
13 Dexter v. Thayer, 189 Mass. 114,75 N.E. 223 (1905). 
14 Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury in the Determination of Preliminary 
Questions of Fact, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 165 (1929). 
151958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 817, 824, 150 N.E.2d 286,291. (Emphasis supplied.) 
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of the foregoing statement, the opinion continues with a citation of 
cases "where relevancy of offered evidence was dependent upon a pre-
liminary question of fact." 16 
The opinions in the cases cited as illustrative, in which relevancy 
was involved, do not indicate that the Court had in mind any such 
differentiation. The language and decisions therein are consistent 
with the application of the general principle that when there is evi-
dence to support a finding, the question of fact is for the judgeP 
However, in the Fauci opinion, the distinction is at least recognized, 
if not asserted, as a basis for a modification of the general rule. 
The writer of this commentary is strongly in favor of the distinction 
proposed by Professor Morgan, for the reasons stated in his article. It 
may be sufficient here to say that fact questions involved in deciding 
the relevancy of evidence are of the type which are within the proper 
province of the jury and not the judge. 
A striking example of an acknowledgment of the validity of this 
proposition without apparent realization of the basis of the distinction 
is seen in Coghlan v. White,18 which the opinion in the Fauci case cites 
with the introduction "Compare." In Coghlan the plaintiff's cause of 
action depended upon the condition precedent of the giving of a 
written notice. The trial judge treated the question as one of prelim-
inary fact for himself, found on conflicting evidence that the notice 
had not in fact been given, excluded the evidence of the notice, and 
directed a verdict for the defendant. In its opinion, the Court stated 
the general principle, and then gave in one unbroken sequence many 
illustrations of its indiscriminate application, citing without distinc-
tion cases involving relevancy and competency of offered evidence, as 
well as others dealing with such matters as interest of a witness (at 
common law), voluntariness of a confession, capacity of a witness and 
qualification of an expert.19 
After having thus apparently established the universal application 
of the general principle that all such fact questions are for the judge, 
the opinion abruptly concludes: "Whether the prima facie effect of the 
return of the constable was overcome by other evidence was a question 
16 Ibid. (Emphasis supplied.) 
17 The cases cited by the Court were as follows: Dexter v. Thayer, 189 Mass. 114, 
115, 75 N.E. 223, 224 (1905), in which the question as to the existence of agency as 
the basis for the admission of a conversation between third persons as binding on 
a party was held to be a preliminary fact question for the judge; Hart Packing Co. 
v. Guild, 251 Mass. 43, 46, 146 N.E. 238,239 (1925), in which the question of whether 
prior leaks were sufficiently connected with a leak in a water pipe which damaged 
property of the plaintiff to show negligence of the defendant was held to be a 
preliminary question (and apparently one of fact) for the judge; Barrett v. Wood 
Realty Inc., 334 Mass. 370, 374, 135 N.E.2d 660, 663 (1956), in which the judge ex-
cluded a statement by a third person as an alleged admission by the defendant and 
also excluded evidence of prior overflows of water similar to that which caused the 
injuries to the plaintiff in a fall, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed on the 
ground that there was no evidence either of authority in the third person to make 
admissions, or of connection between the prior overflowing and that in suit. 
18 236 Mass. 165, 128 N.E. 33 (1920). 
19236 Mass. at 168-169, 128 N.E. at 34-35. 
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of fact upon a vital issue between the parties. Under the circum-
stances it presented a matter for the jury upon which the judge could 
not make a final determination." 20 
The Coghlan case may therefore be cited as an authority for the 
proposition of Professor Morgan, although the opinion gives no indi-
cation that the Court had rationalized the distinction between rele-
vancy and competency. To the Coghlan case may now be added the 
Fauci opinion, although, of course, as dictum at best. 
It is hoped that when an appropriate occasion presents itself, the 
Court will reconsider the indiscriminate application of the general 
principle, and modify it to save for the jury questions of fact deter-
mining the relevancy of offered evidence.21 
20 236 Mass. at 170, 128 N.E. at 35. 
21 Professor Morgan, with Professor John MacArthur Maguire as co-author, in a 
later article, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 909, 913-
918 (1937), comes to the conclusion that the simple proposition that preliminary fact 
questions be reserved for the jury when the question is one of relevancy is not a 
complete answer to this extremely complex problem, citing instances in which the 
question of admissibility may involve both relevancy and competency, as in certain 
hearsay situations. The authors suggest that the technical exclusionary rules, in-
cluding the hearsay rule, require drastic amendment. It does not seem necessary 
nor desirable, however, to await such amendment of the exclusionary rules before 
adopting the proposal of Professor Morgan, which in general would work satisfac-
torily, and would operate to preserve the right to trial by jury in many important 
areas in which it is now lost through a blind application of the general principle 
laid down in the Massachusetts cases. 
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